Watching Libya August 4, 2011

All statistics and graphs in this issue of Watching Libya have been compiled and computed from information provided by the daily operational media updates issued by Allied Joint Force Command at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, in Naples. All updates are archived and may be accessed here.

Unified Protector assets flew an average of 141 sorties a day between March 31 and the midnight of July 31, 2011, of which 53 were strike sorties. The intensity of strike sorties – measured in average daily strike sorties – has diminished slightly over the four months since NATO took over all military operations for Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. The daily average stood at 60 in April (including March 31), 54 in May, 51 in June and 50 in July. The daily average of the overall number of sorties (including strike sorties) was 146 in the first month, rose to 150 in the second, but has since taken a downward path with 138 in June and 129 in July.

Target Concentration - April 2011

In terms of principal hits effected during strike sorties, the pattern of target concentration developed as follows. From the morning of March 31 to midnight of April 30 (see our chart above) over 80 % of hits were concentrated on coastal locations, with targets in and around Misrata taking the heaviest pounding (30 %), followed by Tripoli (23 %) and Sirt (20 %). Zintan and Mizdah (possibly the nearby Mizdah army base) in the Nafusah mountain range south of Tripoli, together took 18 % of the hits.

 Target Concentration - May 2011

More attention appears to have been given to targets in the interior in May (see our chart above). In fact Hun, in the Jufra district on the road between Sirt on the coast and Sabha in the Fezzan, Zintan and Mizdah, together took 31% of hits. The highest concentration, however, was on Tripoli (21 %), Misrata (19%), Sirt (10 %), and Brega (7 %).

Target Concentration - June 2011

Tripoli continued to be the main target in June with 30 % of hits, but increasing attention was given to Brega; this major Libyan oil export hub suffered 29 % of the month’s hits. Misrata followed with 18 %. Zliten – situated 160 km east of Tripoli and 60 km west of Misrata – and Zintan took 6 % each. See our chart above.

Target Concentration - July 2011

The focus on Brega persisted during the month of July (see our chart above) with 27 % of hits. Tripoli, Zliten and Misrata followed with 23 %, 17 % and 14 % respectively. Notwithstanding that – as we had been expecting for many weeks – the resistance in the Nafusah highlands in the north west of the country south of Tripoli intensified, thus drawing increasingly vicious fire from the regime’s forces , the number of hits in the western mountains was quite contained (Gharyan 4%, Zintan 2 %, and Bir Ghanem 2 %). [For more on the strategic importance of the Nafusah range, see Watching Libya July 13, 2011, June 11/12, 2011, Watching Libya April 29, 2011, Watching Libya April 25, 2011, Watching Libya March 25, 2011, Watching Libya March 16, 2011, and Watching Libya March 11, 2011 below.]

NATO data, from which the above statistics and charts were compiled and computed, unfortunately – but understandably – do not disclose any information regarding any airborne measures, if any such measures are indeed being undertaken, to protect (or to assist Transitional National Council/TNC forces to protect) pipelines connecting oil fields south of the Jabal Ahdar and the export oil hubs controlled by the TNC. [Read more about the location of eastern oil fields in relation to the coastal hubs of the Gulf of Sirte and the Cyrenaica in Watching Libya April 5, 2011, Watching Libya April 6, 2011, Watching Libya April 2/3, 2011 and Watching Libya March 11, 2011 below.]

As we said in Watching Libya July 29, 2011: “In view of the slowness with which the Temporary Funding Mechanism is taking off, it is vital that the TNC begins to export oil immediately. Although promises of the imminent unfreezing of some the regime’s international assets have been made, the TNC cannot wait much longer. Its own credibility on the ground in the liberated areas of the country depends on its ability to export oil now.” [Read more about the Temporary Funding Mechanism in Watching Libya May 7/8, 2011.]